Legislature(2001 - 2002)
02/12/2002 03:05 PM House HES
| Audio | Topic |
|---|
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HB 252-STANDARD OF CARE FOR CINA SERVICES [Contains discussion of HB 23, which was used as a basis for Amendment 1 (F.1)] Number 0167 CHAIR DYSON announced that the first order of business would be HOUSE BILL NO. 252, "An Act relating to the construction of certain statutes relating to children; relating to the scope of duty and standard of care for persons who provide services to certain children and families; and providing for an effective date." Number 0180 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL moved to adopt the proposed committee substitute (CS) for HB 252, Version J, 22-LS0454\J, Lauterbach, 2/11/02, as the work draft. There being no objection, Version J was before the committee. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL, sponsor of HB 252, explained that compelling testimony was heard in a House Finance subcommittee hearing that highlighted the need for [higher standards for caseworkers]. He offered that the duty and standard of care created puts a greater pressure on [caseworkers]. He indicated the need for balance in approaching this issue, to raise the standard [of care] and also meet [children's] needs. He said his concerns are met by repealing the language in statute that says there is no standard. He expressed his belief that parents should be included in the bill's language. He characterized [Version J] as having fewer "teeth" while still providing "positive movement." He stated that his aide was present to answer questions during the amendment process. Number 0340 RYNNIEVA MOSS, Staff to Representative John Coghill, Alaska State Legislature, explained the changes from the original bill. Version J changes the requirement for the Division of [Family and Youth] Services (DFYS) to adopt regulations setting a duty and standard of care. Currently, DFYS has policies and procedures similar to the standards addressed in the bill. She said Version J takes the pressure off of DFYS to do something with regulations right away. It does repeal the language in statute that says there is no duty or standard of care. Number 0442 THERESA TANOURY, Director, Division of Family and Youth Service, Department of Health and Social Services, noted that DFYS appreciates the change provided in [Version J]. She offered that [DFYS] believes in and has standards; workers are held to a standard by a code of ethics. "I think this is an easier draft to swallow," she said. Some concern still exists regarding the construction, she pointed out; the fiscal note will be readjusted and brought before the committee. CHAIR DYSON asked if she had any objection to [page 1] line 8, which addresses parental rights. MS. TANOURY replied that she believes the Department of Law has some opinion on this matter. However, she said this construction puts parents' interests slightly above those of the child in question; DFYS objects to this. She indicated that [current statute] places the child's needs above the parents' needs. She referenced discussion with Representative Coghill wherein [DFYS] had suggested a more balanced statement that would equally promote children's and parents' best interests. Number 0553 JAN RUTHERDALE, Assistant Attorney General, Human Services Section, Civil Division (Juneau), Department of Law, offered that she was testifying only on Section 1, whereas Susan Cox of the Department of Law could speak to Section 2. Ms. Rutherdale said AS 47.10.005 is a statutory construction provision; it only comes up when a statute is ambiguous when applied to a particular case. The [existing statutory] construction calls for a court to interpret the statute in a way that promotes the child's welfare. [Version J], however, calls for this interpretation to be based on parents' rights to educate and bring up their children. She offered that this creates a gridlock for the court: Should the court promote the child's welfare or recognize parents' inherent rights? Number 0663 MS. RUTHERDALE told members this language doesn't help the court in these situations. However, she provided suggestions. She referred to AS 47.050.65, enacted in 1998 when the child-in- need-of-aid (CINA) laws were revised; they are the legislative findings, she said. She suggested the wording in [Version J] is found in the legislative findings. For example, parents have the following rights and responsibilities: to provide food, clothing, shelter, education, and medical care; and to train, discipline, protect, nurture, and determine where the child shall live. MS. RUTHERDALE indicated the legislative findings are saying that parents possess those types of rights and responsibilities in raising their children. She suggested that either the legislative findings say what [Version J] is attempting to say or that they warrant revision if the legislature's intent is unclear. Placing those provisions in the construction statute creates a gridlock that hinders the court. She added that if problems exist, such as statutes that are ambiguous or difficult to understand, then perhaps amendments to those provisions are needed. Number 0783 CHAIR DYSON summarized his understanding of Ms. Rutherdale's testimony by saying the Department of Law does not object to the content of the language; rather, it objects to its placement [in the construction section]. MS. RUTHERDALE responded that the particular wording "parents possess inherent, individual rights to direct and control the education" concerns her. The constitution creates certain rights; Alaska's constitution has an actual right of privacy, for example. She explained that creating a statutory pronouncement of inherent rights to direct and control education, for example, might cause later complications in education bills. A parent might say, "I have a right to direct how ... public funds are spent to educate my child." She said she'd be happy to draft other language to target [the intended] meaning. She again offered that the language might already exist in the findings. CHAIR DYSON asked about the difference in the importance of the language, whether it is in the findings or in the construction section. MS. RUTHERDALE replied that she was uncertain about the answer. She pointed out that when she is presenting [a case] to the court, however, she often points to the legislative findings, "Your Honor ... this is what the legislature found, ... so you should find this way because this is really important to the legislature." The construction provides a similar argument. Ms. Rutherdale explained that giving clear guidance to the court to err on a particular side when it is in doubt is an important directive. The court may consider other things such as the legislative findings. She concluded that more than one [directive] in the construction will confuse the court in determining which way to lean. She stated that this issue would not come up often; most statutes are clear to judges. CHAIR DYSON asked what "construction" means as a legal term. MS. RUTHERDALE answered that it means how a law is construed or interpreted. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL asked for the location of the aforementioned statutory citation. MS. RUTHERDALE responded that it is in AS 47.05.[065]. She noted that it was unusual for it to be placed in the administration of welfare, social services, and institutions section, rather than in Chapter 10, which addresses CINA. She said it is clear, however, that these legislative findings apply to Chapter 10; they were all part of the same legislative package. Number 1020 SUSAN COX, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division (Juneau), Department of Law, explained that the language to be repealed by Section 2 of Version J was part of the "Smart Start" package enacted by the legislature in 1998. The rationale for that sentence's insertion was to avoid new liabilities being created by the Smart Start legislation. MS. COX told members the "duty and standard of care" section was included in the package to make clear that the legislature was not intending to create new civil liabilities or claims for damages against the state or its employees in the event that selective Smart Start provisions were not met in their entirety. The section, she offered, does not immunize the state in any way; DFYS and its employees can be sued for negligence if children are not properly protected. The standard in any case is negligence in the failure to take reasonable care to protect children. She noted that the rationale for AS 47.10.960 was to ensure that all the goals in the Smart Start legislation were not used selectively to create a new claim for damages against the department or its employees. The statute reads as follows: Sec. 47.10.960. Duty and standard of care not created. Nothing in this title creates a duty or standard of care for services to children and their families being served under AS 47.10. MS. COX offered that she and [Chair Dyson], among other people, had discussed this at the time; it was part and parcel of the package when it was enacted. Number 1153 MS. COX explained the concern of the Department of Law. Defense attorneys, whose job is to respond to liability claims against the state, foresee that the implication of repealing this sentence is that the legislature intends to mean something. The question is, what is the meaning? Does the legislature intend, by repealing this language, for the state to be held accountable in civil claims for damages for any violation of the many provisions of AS 47.10, for example? If an effort were made to take action in a child protection case, for example, and the social workers and the attorneys had presented the best case to terminate parental rights - and yet the court determined not enough had been done to establish the case for termination - does the legislature want to impose potential liability that the parents could bring against the state? Furthermore, the protection case may continue and parental rights could ultimately be terminated, but a claim could still be made. Number 1222 MS. COX stated that the Smart Start legislation had many goals and a large fiscal note to hire more caseworkers to reduce caseloads. She noted that she'd thought it was understood from the outset that not all of the deadlines and timeframes could possibly be met initially with the available resources. MS. COX noted her concern regarding new liabilities being created by removing this language. She said if the objection to this language is based on concern that Title 47 doesn't create a standard of care for serving children and that some wish the statement to be made that the department must follow it, it is already clear to the department that is must follow [Title 47]. The department has policies and procedures to implement the law, and lawyers to help them accomplish that. She said: If that language is objectionable and needs to be removed, we would certainly request that if it is not the legislature's intention to create new liabilities, that we come up with some substitute language that makes that point clear. CHAIR DYSON asked Ms. Cox if removing the language increases the possibility that state employees would be sued, and whether removing it creates [greater liability] than if the language had never been in statute. MS. COX said it certainly raises the possibility. The language had been in statute, and it is assumed that the legislature means everything it says. Taking it out raises the questions of what the legislature intends to mean and whether it intends to authorize new claims. She said the argument will certainly be made; whether a plaintiff would prevail remains to be seen. Number 1346 MS. COX, in response to a question from Representative Cissna, explained that the plaintiff determines which party to sue: the state, the Department of Health and Social Services, the commissioner, or the social worker personally. The Office of the Attorney General represents whomever the defendant might be, in virtually all suits pertaining to carrying out official duties as a state employee. Most cases in a liability situation are settled with a payment of state money. She added that it is the rare situation in which a social worker acts completely outside the scope of his/her employment, which possibly can lead to personal liability. Number 1420 CHAIR DYSON asked if different wording could be used that would not preclude a standard and that would say the department will be diligent in following its own policies, procedures, and regulations. MS. COX offered that she would be happy to work on language, if the bill is held over, that hopefully would not create a new liability, but would send the message that the legislature wants the department to follow the standard in the bill. Number 1450 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL responded that he'd be open to the foregoing, but wants it clear that there is a continuing responsibility that creates the liability; excusing [workers] is unwise. The CINA statute is intended to protect children, he noted. He said: We give ... some judicial and some police powers to people, and we have excused them [by] this exact language from certain responsibilities; I ... don't think that's wise. And so, I think this is upping the limit. I think that it's going to help us to do things better. I was willing to drop the exact language for how they should do it, but I still think we need to have the upward pressure of saying there is responsibility for the actions that we take. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL indicated he thinks it wise to keep the lines of the limited scope of government clearly defined. He agreed the responsibility level is elevated here. He said he isn't sure he's interested in language that will excuse that. He said he is open to language that will more clearly define these responsibilities. Number 1505 CHAIR DYSON added, "And not necessarily appear to be authorizing lawsuits." He asked Ms. Cox whether this is her concern, should the language be removed. MS. COX replied that this is precisely her concern. She offered that she is definitely concerned about increasing the likelihood of lawsuits. She clarified that language in the bill does not immunize social workers in any way; workers and the department are still subject to litigation under the current law if they are negligent in the provision of services to children they are supposed to protect. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said, "It is also true that you said that by taking this language out, the liability elevates." MS. COX explained that this provision just says that no specific line or sentence in the Smart Start legislation can be taken out and construed to create a claim for damages against the department or a social worker. The legislation passed that established timelines for children's cases doesn't, in itself, create a liability. At the same time, this does not immunize the department, which can be sued - and is sued - for negligence. The language in question simply means that nothing in the bill creates a new cause of action, she said. The possibility of a suit based on failure to act reasonably in providing services does exist. However, taking this language out is an invitation to some to whom it might appear that they can sue [for failure to meet specific provisions in the Smart Start legislation]. Number 1600 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL offered that cases exist wherein a lack of timeliness has caused harm, and some of those issues need to be addressed. He added that [the state] requires others to follow timelines but allows interpretation for one's own benefit. He stated that he finds this problematic. He said, "I agree that it does do that, but we have given police powers and judicial powers to people who are overseeing ... the child-in- need-of-aid cases. And I think ... the tension there is important." CHAIR DYSON announced that he would entertain amendments. Number 1647 REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA moved to adopt Amendment 1, 22-LS0454\F.1, Lauterbach, 2/5/02, which read: Page 1, line 3, following "families;": Insert "relating to intensive family preservation services;" Page 1, following line 13: Insert new bill sections to read: "* Sec. 2. AS 47.10.086(a) is amended to read: (a) Except as provided in (b) and (c) of this section, the department shall make timely, reasonable efforts to provide family support services to the child and to the parents or guardian of the child that are designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to enable the safe return of the child to the family home, when appropriate, if the child is in an out-of-home placement. Within appropriations available for the purpose, the department shall also offer intensive family preservation services when those services are available and the child's safety in the home can be maintained during the time the services are provided. The department's duty to make reasonable efforts under this subsection to provide family support services includes the duty to (1) identify family support services that will assist the parent or guardian in remedying the conduct or conditions in the home that made the child a child in need of aid; (2) actively offer the parent or guardian, and refer the parent or guardian to, the family support services identified under (1) of this subsection; the department shall refer the parent or guardian to community-based family support services whenever community-based services are available and desired by the parent or guardian; and (3) document the department's actions that are taken under [(1) AND (2) OF] this subsection, including whether intensive family preservation services were appropriate, offered, used, or available. * Sec. 3. AS 47.10.086(b) is amended to read: (b) If the court makes a finding at a hearing conducted under AS 47.10.080(l) that a parent or guardian has not sufficiently remedied the parent's or guardian's conduct or the conditions in the home despite reasonable efforts made by the department in accordance with this section, the court may conclude that continuation of reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section are not in the best interests of the child. The department shall then make reasonable efforts to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanent plan and to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child. If the court concludes that continuation of reasonable efforts of the type described in (a) of this section are not in the best interests of the child and intensive family preservation services were not provided in the case, the court shall enumerate in the record the reasons the services were not provided. * Sec. 4. AS 47.10.142(b) is amended to read: (b) The department shall offer available counseling services and intensive family preservation services to the person having legal custody of a minor described in AS 47.10.141 and to the members of the minor's household if it determines that counseling services or intensive family preservation services would be appropriate in the situation. If, after assessing the situation, offering available [COUNSELING] services to the legal custodian and the minor's household, and furnishing appropriate social services to the minor, the department considers it necessary, the department may take emergency custody of the minor. * Sec. 5. AS 47.10 is amended by adding new sections to read: Article 3A. Intensive Family Preservation Services. Sec. 47.10.500. Statewide program. Subject to AS 47.10.510 and 47.10.520, the department shall, within appropriations available for the purpose, provide intensive family preservation services on a statewide basis. The department may provide the services directly or through contracts with private nonprofit providers. Sec. 47.10.510. Effectiveness required. (a) The department shall develop measurable standards that must be met by a provider before a contract may be awarded to the provider under AS 47.10.500. (b) The department may not renew a contract with a provider of services unless the provider can demonstrate that provision of the services prevented or terminated out-of-home placement in at least 70 percent of the cases served by the provider and that out-of-home placement was avoided for a period of at least six months after termination of the services. (c) The department may not continue direct provision of services unless the department can demonstrate that provision of the services prevented or terminated out-of-home placement in at least 70 percent of the cases served and that out-of-home placement was avoided for a period of at least six months after termination of the services. Sec. 47.10.520. Eligibility for services. (a) The department may provide intensive family preservation services to a child, the child's family, and other appropriate nonfamily members only if (1) there are no other available means that will prevent out-of-home placement of the child or make it possible to immediately return the child to the child's home; and (2) the child has been placed in out-of- home care or is at actual, imminent risk of out-of- home placement due to (A) child abuse or neglect; (B) a serious threat of substantial harm to the child's health, safety, or welfare; or (C) family conflict. (b) The department need not provide services to an otherwise eligible family if (1) services are not available in the community in which the family resides; (2) services cannot be provided because the program is filled to capacity; (3) the family refuses the services; (4) the child's case plan does not include reunification of the child and family; or (5) the safety of a child, a family member, or a person providing the services would be unduly threatened. Sec. 47.10 530. Solicitation of funding sources. The department shall solicit federal and private resources that may be available to fund intensive family preservation services. Sec. 47.10.590. Definition. In AS 47.10.500 - 47.10.590, "intensive family preservation services" and "services" mean intensive family preservation services, as defined in AS 47.10.990." Renumber the following bill sections accordingly. Page 2, following line 6: Insert new bill sections to read: "* Sec. 7. AS 47.10.990 is amended by adding a new paragraph to read: (28) "intensive family preservation services" means services provided to a family with a child who is in an out-of-home placement or is at imminent risk of out-of-home placement that (A) are designed to address problems creating the need for out-of-home placement by assisting the family to improve parental and household management competence and by solving practical problems that contribute to family stress so as to improve parental performance and enhance functioning of the family unit; and (B) have the following characteristics: (i) are persistently offered but provided at the family's option; (ii) are provided in the family's home; (iii) are available 24 hours a day and seven days a week; (iv) are provided within 24 hours of initial contact for assistance; (v) are provided for a maximum of 40 days by a single case worker whose caseload is not more than two families at any one time; and (vi) may, in appropriate instances and subject to available appropriations, include monetary assistance for special needs of the family, such as to obtain food, shelter, or clothing or to purchase other goods or services that will enhance the effectiveness of other services offered to help preserve the family. * Sec. 8. AS 47.17.030(d) is amended to read: (d) Before the department or a local government health or social services agency may seek the termination of parental rights under AS 47.10, it shall offer protective social services and pursue all other reasonable means of protecting the child. The department or agency shall also consider the eligibility of the child and family for intensive family preservation services under AS 47.10.500 - 47.10.590." Renumber the following bill sections accordingly. Page 2, following line 7: Insert a new bill section to read: "* Sec. 10. The uncodified law of the State of Alaska is amended by adding a new section to read: STUDY. (a) The Department of Health and Social Services shall conduct a study in at least one region of the state in order to (1) develop a valid and reliable process for accurately identifying clients who are eligible for intensive family preservation services; (2) collect data on which to base projections of service needs, budget requests, and long-range planning related to intensive family preservation services; (3) develop regional and statewide projections of needs for intensive family preservation services; (4) develop a cost estimate for implementation and expansion of intensive family preservation services on a statewide basis; (5) develop a long-range plan and time frame for ultimately making intensive family preservation services available to all eligible families; and (6) collect data regarding the number of children in foster care, group care, institutional care, and other out-of-home care due to medical needs, mental health needs, developmental disabilities, and juvenile offenses and to assess the feasibility of expanding intensive family preservation services eligibility to include all of these children. (b) By November 30, 2004, the Department of Health and Social Services shall submit a report to the governor describing the study required under this section and including the department's conclusions and recommendations that are based on the study. The department shall notify the legislature that the report is available. (c) In this section, "intensive family preservation services" has the meaning given in AS 47.10.990." Renumber the following bill sections accordingly. Page 2, line 8: Delete "2" Insert "6" Page 2, line 9: Delete "Section 3" Insert "Section 9" Delete "sec. 2" Insert "sec. 6" Page 2, following line 10: Insert a new bill section to read: "* Sec. 13. Except as provided in secs. 11 and 12 of this Act, this Act takes effect July 1, 2002." [End of Amendment 1; please note that it amends Version F, the original bill, whereas the committee was now working from Version J.] CHAIR DYSON asked whether there was any objection to putting Amendment 1 before the committee. There being no objection, Amendment 1 was before the committee. Number 1690 REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA offered an amendment to Amendment 1, to delete lines 1 and 2 [of the amendment], which read: Page 1, line 3, following "families;" Insert "relating to intensive family preservation services;" CHAIR DYSON asked whether there was any objection. [The foregoing amendment to Amendment 1 was treated as adopted.] REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA noted that a second amendment to Amendment 1 would change line 4 [page 1 of the amendment] to read, "Page 2, following line 1:". This change is to reflect Version J, she explained. [The original amendment language read, "Page 1, following line 13:".] CHAIR DYSON asked if there was any objection. There being no objection, [the second amendment to Amendment 1] was adopted. Number 1751 CHAIR DYSON asked whether the dates had been straightened out. REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA replied yes. CHAIR DYSON announced that Amendment 1 has pen-and-ink changes that are part of the official amendment. [The only pen-and-ink change on members' copies was a date change in Section 10, subsection (b): following "By November 30," delete "2003" and insert "2004". Therefore, that change was treated as part of Amendment 1.] Number 1790 CHAIR DYSON called an at-ease at 3:37 p.m. He called the meeting back to order at 3:40 p.m. [Attention would return to Amendment 1 after adoption of Amendment 2.] Number 1811 REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA began discussion of what would become [Amendment 2]. She indicated Section 3 in Version J should have been deleted. She noted that Amendment 1 has a new Section 3. CHAIR DYSON suggested moving an amendment to Version J that deletes the language in Section 3 on page 2, line 1. [Page 2, line 1, read: "Section 1 of this Act takes effect immediately under AS 01.10.070(c)."] CHAIR DYSON announced that the foregoing was the proposed amendment [Amendment 2]. He asked whether there was any objection. There being no objection, [Amendment 2] was adopted. Number 1882 REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA returned attention to Amendment 1. She explained that [Section 2 of the amendment] gives the department an additional resource, in order to meet the new standard of care required in [Version J]. The language had originated in HB 23 [sponsored by Representative Cissna], which proposed a pilot study for intensive family preservation services. These services provide that a standard of care be in place through a program that the courts can use as a new tool. Number 1939 REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA explained that this tool could be utilized by the department now, but isn't currently being chosen as such. This allows the courts to allow families to choose an intensive family preservation program as an alternative to having their children removed from the home. This puts workers in the home, working with the family while keeping the child safe. She emphasized that the first consideration in this program is the safety of the child. More than 30 states have successfully adopted this model; it originated over 20 years ago and has had very successful outcomes. She offered that her aide would explain the more technical adaptations in [Amendment 1] that he has worked out with Representative Coghill's aide. Number 2000 CHAIR DYSON asked Representative Cissna if she had intended to imply that intensive family preservation services cannot be provided if the child has been removed from the family. REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA answered, "Yes, they can and they are, in other states that have adopted them." She said these services are most effective when provided before the child is removed, but are still a reasonable alternative after removal if the courts decide it is appropriate. It is a court decision, she emphasized. Number 2027 REPRESENTATIVE WILSON asked if her understanding was correct that the services are most effective right before the child is removed; at this point, the family is in crisis and is more likely to do anything to retain custody. REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA concurred, adding that after a child has been removed, a crisis dynamic can exist. The [intensive family preservation model] is a crisis model. Another reason to provide services before the child is removed is because many studies have shown damage to children due to absence from their parents, during which bonds can be broken. She offered that the better situation avoids damage to the child. Number 2074 NATE MOHATT, Staff to Representative Sharon Cissna, Alaska State Legislature, offered to clear up questions regarding the "pen- and-ink changes" made to Amendment 1. [The only change on members' copies was the date-change specified earlier, but Mr. Mohatt's copy of Amendment 1 had changes that brought it into alignment with Version J.] MR. MOHATT indicated [the third amendment to Amendment 1], therefore, would be to delete lines 12-15 on page 4 of Amendment 1, which read: Renumber the following bill sections accordingly. Page 2, following line 6: Insert new bill sections to read: CHAIR DYSON restated the foregoing and asked whether there was any objection. There being no objection, the third amendment to Amendment 1 was adopted. Number 2144 MR. MOHATT stated that [the fourth amendment to Amendment 1] would be to delete lines 18-21 on page 5 of Amendment 1, which read: Renumber the following bill sections accordingly. Page 2, following line 7: Insert a new bill section to read: CHAIR DYSON restated the foregoing and asked whether there was any objection. There being no objection, the fourth amendment to Amendment 1 was adopted. Number 2160 MR. MOHATT offered that [the fifth amendment to Amendment 1] would be to delete lines 16-29 on page 6 of Amendment 1, which read: Renumber the following bill sections accordingly. Page 2, line 8: Delete "2" Insert "6" Page 2, line 9: Delete "Section 3" Insert "Section 9" Delete "sec. 2" Insert "sec. 6" Page 2, following line 10: Insert a new bill section to read: CHAIR DYSON restated the foregoing and asked whether there was any objection. There being no objection, the fifth amendment to Amendment 1 was adopted. CHAIR DYSON requested that a clean copy be provided to the committee before start of business on Thursday [February 14]. He noted that the Department of Law would be encouraged to make suggestions as well, and to talk to [Representative Coghill and Representative Cissna] before coming to the meeting. Number 2189 REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA told members that one significant piece that presumably will affect [DFYS's] financial view of this is the cost. Foster care in Alaska costs $8,000 to $17,000 a child each year. Other states incur costs between $2,000 and $8,000 a family each year for intensive family preservation services, she explained - substantially less. Number 2233 REPRESENTATIVE JOULE said he was interested in having an answer at the following meeting regarding the availability of this service throughout the state. Number 2267 CHAIR DYSON asked Ms. Tanoury if she'd been aware that [Amendment 1] was going to be offered. MS. TANOURY replied yes. CHAIR DYSON recounted that Ms. Tanoury had indicated in discussion with himself a year ago that it is DFYS's goal now to provide whatever services a troubled family needs in order to function. He asked what [Amendment 1] would change for DFYS. Number 2290 MS. TANOURY offered her assumption that [Amendment 1] is identical to HB 23, which calls for DFYS to use existing funding to provide [intensive family preservation services]. She said this is a specific model in which caseloads are reduced to two cases per worker; it is a six-week service model. She pointed out the importance of having the right families receive this service; it might not be the right service for every family. She indicated DFYS would have to work with existing grantees to determine how to implement this model; she surmised it would be a grant model rather than through state employees. MS. TANOURY explained that some funding would be required for the study; she estimated an $80,000 fiscal note, which was the amount for HB 23. She concluded that [Amendment 1] calls for DFYS to use existing funding, which means working with existing grantees that provide family support services, family preservation services, and a time-limited family reunification service model. [Amendment 1] would provide a specific model under that grant program. She remarked, "It would impact those grantees to the extent we don't know how we would work with those grantees on this model." TAPE 02-8, SIDE B Number 2342 CHAIR DYSON asked Ms. Tanoury if HB 252, as amended, forces DFYS to do a pilot. MS. TANOURY said that is her understanding. In response to further questions, she said the amendments will significantly alter the fiscal note, and that a new fiscal note would be prepared before the [February 14] meeting. [Elmer Lindstrom, Deputy Commissioner, Department of Health and Social Services, declined to testify but suggested the Department of Law might have a fiscal concern.] Number 2286 TONY LOMBARDO, Alaska Association of Homes for Children; Covenant House Alaska, testified via teleconference. The Alaska Association of Homes for Children represents 450 licensed residential beds for the provision of services to Alaskan children, he noted. He offered support for the original version of the bill. He observed that significant changes had been made today, but he indicated that these changes are still in line with the position of the Alaska Association of Homes for Children. MR. LOMBARDO turned attention to Section 1, the construction section of the bill itself. He said this section is "read by the court like a headline to each section that follows." He expressed his opinion that any change to the construction section will be perceived as a clear enunciation of best practices in every aspect of CINA proceedings. The social workers in the Alaska Association of Homes for Children believe that such an enunciation of best practices is positive, he told members. MR. LOMBARDO referenced Department of Law testimony that indicated this section could be confusing to the court; he said guiding legal principles exist such as "in pari materia," which means the court will have the opportunity to read related sections along with the construction section. Mr. Lombardo said, "We continue to support that; we think that's a good section." He offered that this could just as easily be expressed in policies or regulations. He surmised, however, that this might be more work for the department than what was accomplished today. MR. LOMBARDO turned to Section 2 of the bill. He suggested that repealing AS 47.10.960 may or may not result in changes for the state. Changing the liability can create the perception of an opportunity, and this is always a risk, he said. He said people sue the state all the time if they feel they have been wronged by a state agency. He continued, "The bottom line for us is that we champion accountability for all state agencies working with children." He added that any step in that direction is a good one. Number 2170 MR. LOMBARDO told members, "The potentiality ... in the first bill for creating kind of an onerous series of regulations through the state was a problem. We didn't want to see them have to do a lot of expensive work that took time away from the kids. So we're glad that you're dropping that." He stated his continued support for [the provisions from HB 23]; the family reunification services championed by Representative Cissna have always been an excellent idea, he added. Number 2125 LAUREE HUGONIN, Director, Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, noted that she was just now seeing Amendment 1 for the first time. She expressed concern about the implementation of family preservation services. It is important to have safeguards in place when working with families in which there are adult victims, she offered. It is also important to think through how "family" is defined when attempting to reunify a family; this applies to both domestic violence situations and sexual-abuse-of-a-minor situations when the offender is a parent. She stated that this requires special skills and thought, and it is not something to be entered into lightly. MS. HUGONIN turned attention to page 4, line 4, of Amendment 1, which read [beginning on line 3]: (5) the safety of a child, a family member, or a person providing the services would be unduly threatened. She suggested this indicates there is some level of threat that is acceptable. Therefore, she asked the committee to consider removing the word "unduly". Number 2040 MS. HUGONIN brought attention to page 3, line 25 [Amendment 1], which read: (C) family conflict. She requested that it be changed. She asked, "What is family conflict? What does that concept entail?" She asked whether this means that people just can't work things out, or means domestic violence. She noted that family preservation services in other states have been tried in some of the worst-case scenarios. She said, "I think there may be some examples out there where these services are at the front - they're with neglected families." MS. HUGONIN indicated it might be a better use of funds to target families with problems earlier; this could prevent later, more serious problems. She noted her impression that these services are focused on families with serious problems, instead of earlier intervention in families in which neglect is the problem. "It's probably pretty late in the process to be thinking about a new model of doing that, but maybe for further dialogue you could look at trying to help those families who are still in the neglect stage," she added. Number 1994 REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA agreed with Ms. Hugonin. She said this model has been used very successfully with domestic violence situations in which there has been a restraining order. She remarked: As we know, that's the most crucial time sometimes, [and] some of the most dangerous times [are] right after you have a worker in the home that can be there for long periods of time. And sometimes ... the worker goes and stays with the person who has made the ... restraint order to make sure that the family member is safe. REPRESENTATIVE CISSNA said the [intensive family preservation] model has worked very well in this type of situation. She agreed the money should be spent on [earlier intervention], noting that this [model] has been proposed because it offers one last chance at the "teachable moment." She concurred with Ms. Hugonin's suggestion to define "family conflict." Number 1919 CHAIR DYSON announced that HB 252 would be held over until [February 14].
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|